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Are financial systems shock absorbers or shock amplifiers? 
Policymakers and academics have long remained divided over this 
fundamental question. On the one hand, some contend that financial 
innovation and integration make the financial world a safer place 
(Greenspan, 1999); others argue the opposite by appealing to the 
same driving forces (Rajan, 2005). The rapid financial innovation of 
the past several years has acted as both good and bad cholesterol—
serving to lower the probability of crisis, but fattening the tail 
of the distribution of losses for the financial system as a whole 
(Gieve, 2006; Gai and Haldane, 2007). Although advanced country 
financial systems have withstood numerous shocks in recent years 
(the collapse of Amaranth, the events surrounding General Motors, 
9/11, and the Dotcom crash, to name a few), the events triggered by 
the subprime crisis of August 2007 have been “super-systemic” in 
scope, enveloping financial institutions across the major economies 
as well as faraway Iceland and New Zealand.1 
The intricate network of claims and obligations that now link the 
balance sheets of financial intermediaries raises challenges for the 
positive analysis of contagion in the modern financial system. In a 
We are grateful to Jason Dowson for excellent research assistance. We would also 
like to thank Michael Bordo, Fabio Castiglionesi, Geoff Coppins, Avinash Dixit, Andy 
Haldane, Simon Hall, Jorge Selaive, Gabriel Sterne, and Garry Schinasi for helpful 
comments and suggestions. This paper does not necessarily represent the views of the 
Bank of England or Monetary Policy Committee members.
1. We owe the term super-systemic to Andy Haldane.
Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking, edited by Rodrigo A. 
Alfaro, Santiago, Chile. © 2010 Central Bank of Chile.412 Prasanna Gai and Sujit Kapadia
seminal analysis, Allen and Gale (2000) demonstrate how the spread 
of contagion depends crucially on the pattern of interconnectedness 
between banks. When the network is complete, with all banks 
having exposures to each other such that the amount of interbank 
deposits held by any bank is evenly spread over all other banks, 
the impact of a shock is readily attenuated. By contrast, the system 
is more fragile when the network is incomplete, with banks only 
having exposures to a few counterparties. The initial impact of 
a shock is concentrated among neighboring banks. Once these 
succumb, the premature liquidation of long-term assets and the 
associated loss of value bring previously unaffected banks into the 
front line of contagion.2 
The financial turmoil of 2007-09 has also made clear how 
the interdependent nature of financial balance sheets creates an 
environment for indirect contagion to occur. As Cifuentes, Ferrucci, 
and Shin  (2005), Shin (2008), and Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009) 
stress, the knock-on effect of the default of a financial institution on 
asset prices can trigger further rounds of default as other financial 
entities are forced to write down the value of their assets. In practice, 
technical default is not necessary for this effect to be relevant, as 
recent events highlight. Contagion from direct interlinkages of claims 
and obligations may thus be reinforced, particularly if the market 
for key financial assets is illiquid.
Given the speed with which shocks propagate, there is a need to 
develop tools that permit economists to articulate the probability and 
impact of shocks to the financial system. The complexity of modern 
financial systems means that policymakers have scant information 
about the true interlinkages between financial intermediaries. 
Securitization, for example, means that U.S. mortgage-backed 
securities acquired by investors in New Zealand or India expose 
households in these countries to credit events in Ohio. Information 
on such linkages is typically not in the public domain. Moreover, 
the intricacy of financial transactions has been such that private 
sector agents are also often no longer able to ascertain their own 
or others’ exposure to credit risk. In this context, models such as 
Allen and Gale (2000), which are based on rigid structures with a 
handful of banks, have limited appeal. More recent literature on 
2. See Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) for similar results. Network models have 
also been applied to a range of other topics in finance; for a comprehensive survey, see 
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endogenous network formation (such as Leitner, 2005; Castiglionesi 
and Navarro, 2007) also fails to offer a framework that allows 
for arbitrary network structures or for a distinction between the 
probability and spread of contagion.
In this paper, we develop a network model of financial contagion 
that builds on techniques from the literature on complex systems 
(Strogatz, 2001). Although this type of approach is frequently applied 
to the study of epidemiology and ecology, and despite the obvious 
parallels between financial systems and ecosystems highlighted 
by prominent authors (such as May, Levin, and Sugihara, 2008), 
this methodology has yet to be applied to economic problems. Our 
model allows for arbitrary network structure and explicitly accounts 
for the nature and scale of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, as 
well as asset price interactions. Although the model can be solved 
analytically under certain assumptions, we present numerical results 
to illustrate and clarify the nonlinear system dynamics of the model.3 
In so doing, we are able to isolate the probability of contagion in the 
financial system from its potential spread. 
We find that financial systems exhibit a robust-yet-fragile 
tendency. While greater connectivity reduces the likelihood of 
contagion, the impact on the financial system, should problems 
occur, could be on a significantly larger scale than before. Our results 
thus nest the two views of financial systems as shock absorbers 
versus amplifiers. The wider and deeper is financial innovation 
and integration, the more likely that the financial system serves as 
a shock absorber by enabling risk sharing. But innovation also has 
a dark side and can lead risk sharing to become risk spreading. So, 
although the incidence of acute financial distress may have fallen 
with greater financial interconnectedness, episodes of distress could 
have greater impact.
The rescue of American International Group (AIG) serves to 
illustrate the type of analysis made possible by our framework. A 
key reason given by policymakers for the rescue was concern that 
banks across the international financial system might have been 
exposed to AIG via credit derivative contracts. But how far could 
contagion have spread had AIG been allowed to fail? More generally, 
3. Gai and Kapadia (2010) provide details of the analytical solution, applying 
techniques used in percolation theory (Callaway and others, 2000; Newman, Strogatz, 
and Watts, 2001; Watts, 2002) and in the epidemiological literature on the spread of 
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how might the expansion of credit risk transfer over the past decade 
have affected the nature of contagion? Given the limited information 
that policymakers have about the true interlinkages involved, the 
connections implied by credit derivatives are, perhaps, best captured 
by a random graph network of the type we consider here. Our results 
suggest that under plausible parameter values, greater use of credit 
derivatives might have reduced the likelihood of contagion. At the 
same time, by creating complex and far-reaching interlinkages in 
the financial system, their increased use could cause contagion to 
be transmitted much more widely.
A natural criticism of our framework is that it assumes that 
financial connections between intermediaries are formed randomly 
and exogenously and are static in nature. This leads us to model 
the contagion process in a relatively mechanical fashion, holding 
balance sheets and the size and structure of interbank linkages 
constant as default propagates through the system. Although not cast 
in a traditional optimizing setup, our approach does yield a useful 
and realistic benchmark for analysis. Arguably, in normal times, 
developed country banks are robust, and minor variations in their 
default probabilities do not affect lending decisions on the interbank 
market. In crises, however, as illustrated by the sudden failures of 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, contagion may spread rapidly, 
with banks having little time to alter their behavior before they are 
affected. Note also that banks have no choice over whether to default. 
This precludes strategic behavior on networks of the type discussed 
by Morris (2000), Jackson and Yariv (2007), and Galeotti and Goyal 
(2007), where nodes can choose whether to adopt a particular state 
(such as adopting a new technology).
Our paper is related to a large empirical literature that uses 
counterfactual simulations to assess the danger of contagion 
in a range of national banking systems (see Upper, 2007, for a 
comprehensive survey). This literature has largely tended to use 
actual or estimated data on interbank lending to simulate the 
effects of the failure of an individual bank on financial stability.4 
The evidence of contagion risk from idiosyncratic shocks is mixed. 
Furfine (2003) and Wells (2004) report relatively limited scope for 
contagion in the U.S. and U.K. banking systems. By contrast, Upper 
4. A parallel literature explores contagion risk in payment systems; see, for example, 
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and Worms (2004) and van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) suggest 
that contagion risk may be somewhat higher in Germany and the 
Netherlands. Mistrulli’s (2007) results for the Italian banking 
system echo the findings of this paper: he finds that while relatively 
small fraction of banks can trigger contagion, large parts of the 
system are affected in worst-case scenarios. Moreover, he shows that 
when moving from an analysis of actual bilateral exposures (which 
form an incomplete network) to a complete structure estimated 
using maximum entropy techniques, the probability of contagion 
from a random, idiosyncratic bank failure is reduced, but its spread 
is sometimes widened.
Contagion from aggregate shocks is examined by Elsinger, Lehar, 
and Summer (2006), who combine a model of interbank lending in 
the Austrian banking system with models of market and credit risk. 
They take draws from a distribution of risk factors and compute 
the effects on banks’ solvency, calculating the probability and the 
severity of contagion. Their findings also echo the results reported 
here. While contagious failures are relatively rare, if contagion does 
occur, it affects a large part of the banking system.
As noted by Upper (2007), existing empirical studies are plagued 
by data problems, and the extent to which reported interbank 
exposures reflect true linkages is unclear: generally, interbank 
exposures are only reported on a particular day once a quarter 
and exclude a range of items, including intraday exposures. They 
therefore underestimate the true scale of financial connectivity. 
Moreover, national supervisory authorities do not generally receive 
information on the exposures of foreign banks to domestic institutions, 
which makes it difficult to model the risk of global contagion in the 
increasingly international financial system. All of this, coupled with 
short time series for the relevant data, complicates the empirical 
assessment of the effects of changes in network structure, as perhaps 
induced by credit risk transfer, on contagion risk. This highlights 
the importance of analytical and simulation-based approaches to 
explore these issues.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 describes the 
analytical framework. Section 2 uses numerical simulations to study 
the effects of failures of individual institutions and articulate the 
likelihood and extent of contagion. It also considers the impact of 
liquidity effects and credit derivatives on system stability. A final 
section concludes.416 Prasanna Gai and Sujit Kapadia
1. analyTiCal fRamewoRk
Consider a financial network in which n financial intermediaries, 
(banks for short) are randomly linked together by their claims on each 
other. In the language of graph theory, each bank represents a node 
on the graph, and the interbank exposures of bank i define the links 
with other banks. Since interbank linkages comprise assets as well 
as liabilities, the links in the network are directed: incoming links, 
which point into a node or bank, correspond to the interbank assets 
or exposures of that bank (that is, the money owed to that bank by a 
counterparty); by contrast, outgoing links, which point out from a node, 
correspond to its interbank liabilities. Figure 1 shows an example of 
a directed financial network in which there are five banks.
Figure 1. A Directed Network with Five Nodes
Source: Authors’ drawing.
Two crucial properties of graphs such as those in figure 1 are their 
degree distribution and average degree. Let us denote the number 
of incoming links, or in-degree, to bank i by ji, and the number of 
outgoing links, or out-degree, by ki. We can then define the joint degree 
distribution of in- and out-degree, pjk, to be the probability that a 
randomly chosen node simultaneously has in-degree j and out-degree k. 
Further, since every interbank asset of a bank is an interbank liability 
of another, every outgoing link for one node is an incoming link for 
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In what follows, the joint distribution of in- and out-degree 
governs the potential for the spread of shocks through the network. 
A feature of our analysis is that this joint degree distribution, and 
hence the structure of the links in the network, is entirely arbitrary, 
though a specific distributional assumption is made in our numerical 
simulations.
Suppose that the total assets of each bank are normalized to 
unity and that these consist of interbank assets, Ai
IB, and illiquid 
external retail assets, such as mortgages and corporate loans, AR
i. 
Since we might expect a bank with more incoming links to have a 
greater total interbank asset position, we allow for the relative shares 
of interbank and retail assets to depend on the bank’s in-degree, ji. 
Given these assumptions, 




i ( ) ( ) % , + = ∀ 1     (2)
where Ai
IB(0) = 0.5 We assume that the total interbank asset position 
of every bank is evenly distributed over each of its incoming links. 
Although this assumption is stylized, it provides a useful benchmark 
that emphasizes the possible benefits of diversification.
Since every interbank asset is another bank’s liability, interbank 
liabilities, Li
IB , are endogenously determined. Apart from interbank 
liabilities, the only other component of a bank’s liabilities are 
exogenously given customer deposits, Di. The condition for bank i 
to be solvent is therefore






i ,  (3)
5. Across the entire financial system, we might expect total retail assets to be fixed. 
This would imply a dependence between the average share of retail assets on bank 
balance sheets and the number of financial intermediaries in the system. As discussed 
below, our numerical simulations take this dependency into account.418 Prasanna Gai and Sujit Kapadia
where φ  is the fraction of banks with obligations to bank i that 
have defaulted, λ is the average loss-given-default on interbank 
loans, and q is the resale price of the illiquid asset. The value of λ is 
constrained to lie between zero and one: λ = 1 corresponds to a zero 
recovery assumption, namely, that when a linked bank defaults, 
bank i loses all of its interbank assets held against that bank. The 
value of q may be less than one in the event of asset sales by banks 
in default, but it equals one if there are no fire sales. The solvency 






























IB -Di is the bank’s capital buffer, that is, 
the difference between the book value of its assets and liabilities.
To model the dynamics of contagion, we suppose that all banks in 
the network are initially solvent and that the network is perturbed 
at time t = 1 by the initial default of a single bank. Although purely 
idiosyncratic shocks are rare, the crystallization of operational risk 
(for example, fraud) has led to the failure of financial institutions 
in the past (as in the case of Barings). Alternatively, bank failure 
may result from an aggregate shock that has particularly adverse 
consequences for one institution: this can be captured in the model 
through a general erosion in the stock of retail assets or, equivalently, 
capital buffers across all banks, combined with a major loss for one 
particular institution.
Recall that ji denotes the number of incoming links for bank i. 
Since linked banks each lose a fraction 1 / ji of their interbank assets 
when a single counterparty defaults, it is clear from equation (4) 
that the only way default can spread is if there is a neighboring 
bank for which 
















We define banks that are exposed in this sense to the default 
of a single neighbor as vulnerable and other banks as safe. The 
vulnerability of a bank clearly depends on its in-degree, j. Specifically, 
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(6)
Further, the probability of a bank having in-degree j and out-degree 
k and being vulnerable is υj jk p · .
The model structure described by equations (2) to (6) captures 
several features of interest in systemic risk analysis. First, as noted 
above, the nature and scale of adverse aggregate or macroeconomic 
events can be interpreted as a negative shock to the stock of retail 
assets, Ai
R, or, equivalently, to the capital buffer, Ki. Second, 
idiosyncratic shocks can be modeled by assuming the exogenous 
default of a bank. Third, the structural characteristics of the financial 
system are described by the distribution of interbank linkages, pjk, 
and much can be learned about the nature of contagion by simply 
exploring the effects of varying the average degree in the network, 
z. Fourth, the implications of different dependencies between the 
total interbank asset position and the number of exposures can be 
explored by changing the functional form of Ai
IB (ji). Finally, liquidity 
effects associated with the potential knock-on effects of default on 
asset prices are captured by allowing q to vary.
In Gai and Kapadia (2010), we use probability-generating 
function techniques to obtain analytical results on the transmission 
of shocks in the system as a function of vj and pjk in the special case 
in which the total interbank asset position is independent of the 
number of the bank’s incoming links—that is, Ai
IB (ji) is constant and 
does not depend on ji—and both λ and q are set equal to one. That 
paper shows that under these assumptions, financial systems exhibit 
a robust-yet-fragile tendency. While greater connectivity reduces the 
likelihood of contagion, its potential spread could be significantly 
greater should problems occur.
The intuition underpinning these results is straightforward. 
In a more connected system, the counterparty losses of a failing 
institution can be more widely dispersed to, and absorbed by, other 
entities. Increased connectivity and risk sharing may thus lower 
the probability of contagion. However, conditional on the failure 
of one institution triggering contagious defaults, a higher number 
of financial linkages also increases the potential for contagion to 
spread more widely. In particular, greater connectivity increases the 
chances that the institutions that survive the effects of the initial 
default will be exposed to more than one defaulting counterparty 420 Prasanna Gai and Sujit Kapadia
after the first round of contagion, making them vulnerable to a 
second-round default. The impact of any crisis that does occur could 
therefore be larger.
In Gai and Kapadia (2010), we discuss how assuming an uneven 
distribution of interbank assets over incoming links would not change 
any of their fundamental results. The effects of the other simplifying 
assumptions required to obtain an analytical solution are less clear. 
In particular, that paper does not explore the implications of making 
the total interbank asset position dependent on the number of 
exposures, making it difficult to assess, for example, the effects of more 
widespread use of credit derivatives. Therefore, in what follows, we use 
numerical simulations to explore the implications of relaxing some of 
the simplifying assumptions needed to solve the model analytically.
2. numeRiCal simulaTions
In our numerical simulations, we assume a uniform (Poisson) 
random graph in which each possible directed link in the graph is 
present with independent probability p. In other words, the network 
is constructed by looping over all possible directed links and 
choosing each one to be present with probability p. Consistent with 
bankruptcy law, we do not net interbank positions, so it is possible 
for two banks to be linked with each other in both directions. The 
average degree, z, is allowed to vary in each simulation. Although 
our model applies to networks of fully heterogeneous financial 
intermediaries, we take the capital buffers and asset positions on 
banks’ balance sheets to be identical.
As a benchmark, we consider a network of 1,000 banks. Clearly, 
the number of financial intermediaries in a system depends on how 
the system is defined and what counts as a financial intermediary. 
However, several countries have banking networks of this size, and 
a figure of 1,000 intermediaries also seems reasonable if we are 
considering a global financial system involving investment banks, 
hedge funds, and other players. Given this rather high number of 
banks, when calculating the probability and conditional spread of 
contagion, we only count episodes in which over 5 percent of the 
system defaults, as this seems a suitable lower bound for defining a 
systemic financial crisis in such a large system. When assessing the 
impact of credit risk transfer, we change these assumptions to reflect 
the smaller number of major players in credit derivative markets 
and their greater systemic importance.421 A Network Model of Super-Systemic Crises
Except for the credit derivative experiment, interbank assets 
are assumed not to depend on the number of incoming links and 
are held constant at 20 percent of total assets, with retail assets 
making up the rest.6 Banks’ capital buffers are set at 4 percent, a 
figure calibrated from data contained in the 2005 published accounts 
of a range of large, international financial institutions.7 Since each 
bank’s interbank assets are evenly distributed over its incoming 
links, interbank liabilities are determined endogenously within the 
network structure. The liability side of the balance sheet is topped 
up by customer deposits until the total liability position equals the 
total asset position.
In the experiments that follow, we draw 1,000 realizations of 
the network for each value of z used. In each of these draws, we 
shock one bank at random, wiping out all of its external assets—this 
type of idiosyncratic shock may be interpreted as a fraud shock. 
The failed bank defaults on all of its interbank liabilities. As a 
result, neighboring banks may also default if their capital buffer is 
insufficient to cover their loss on interbank assets. Any neighboring 
banks that fail are also assumed to default on all of their interbank 
liabilities, and the iterative process continues until no new banks 
are pushed into default.
2.1 Benchmark Case
As a benchmark, figure 2 depicts the numerical solution under the 
assumptions needed to solve the model analytically. With no links, 
contagion is impossible by definition. Therefore, for very low values 
of z, the likelihood of contagion is increasing in connectivity.
More interesting is what happens for higher values of z. The 
frequency of contagion gradually falls as risk-sharing effects serve 
to reduce the number of vulnerable banks in the system. When 
contagion does break out, however, it affects an increasing fraction 
of the system. Indeed, for z > 8, contagion never occurs more than 
five times in 1,000 draws, but in each case where it does break out, 
every bank in the network fails. In addition to pointing toward 
the robust-yet-fragile nature of financial networks, this serves to 
highlight that a priori indistinguishable shocks to the network can 
6. The 20 percent share of interbank assets is broadly consistent with the figures 
for developed countries reported by Upper (2007). 
7. Further details are available on request.422 Prasanna Gai and Sujit Kapadia
have vastly different consequences for contagion. In each draw, the 
initial shock is the failure of a single bank. In general, this does not 
cause contagion, but it is catastrophic in a small handful of cases. 
This feature of the complex network cautions against assuming 
that past resilience to a particular shock will continue to apply to 
future shocks of a similar magnitude. It also highlights the acute 
difficulties that policymakers may have when trying to assess the 
contagion risk from the failure of an institution if they do not have 
a good understanding of the structure of the financial network.
Figure 3 shows how the results change as banks’ capital 
buffers vary. As might be expected, an erosion of capital buffers 
increases the probability of contagion for fixed values of z.8 For 
small values of z, the extent of contagion is also slightly greater 
when capital buffers are lower but, in all cases, it reaches one for 
sufficiently high values of z. When the capital buffer is increased 
to 5 percent, however, this occurs well after the peak probability of 
contagion. This neatly illustrates how increased connectivity can 
simultaneously reduce the probability of contagion and increase 
its spread when it does break out.
8. Reduced capital buffers may also increase the likelihood of an initial default. 
Therefore, they may contribute to an increased probability of contagion from this 
perspective, as well.
Figure 2. Contagion in the Benchmark Case
Source: Authors’ calculations.423 A Network Model of Super-Systemic Crises
Figure 3. Contagion under Different Capital Buffers
Source: Authors’ calculations.
2.2 Positive Recovery Rates
Solving the model analytically requires assuming a 100 percent 
loss given default on interbank assets. This assumption may well 
be realistic in the midst of a crisis: in the immediate aftermath of a 
default, the recovery rate and the timing of recovery will be highly 
uncertain, and banks’ funders are likely to assume the worst-case 
scenario. To assess the robustness of the results, we relax the zero 
recovery assumption and assume that when a bank fails, its default in 
the interbank market equals its asset shortfall (that is, its outstanding 
loss after its capital buffer is absorbed) plus half of any remaining 
interbank liabilities, where the additional amount is interpreted as 
reflecting bankruptcy costs that are lost outside the system (see figure 
4).9 As we might expect from equation (6), this reduces the likelihood 
9. Since interbank assets make up 20 percent of each bank’s total asset position, 
interbank liabilities must, on average, make up 20 percent of total liabilities. Therefore, 
if we take (insured) customer deposits as senior, the maximum bankruptcy cost for the 
average bank under this assumption is 10 percent of total assets or liabilities, which 
accords with the empirical estimates of bankruptcy costs in the banking sector reported 
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of contagion because fewer banks are vulnerable when the recovery 
rate is positive. This exercise illustrates that relaxing the zero recovery 
assumption does not fundamentally affect our broad results.
Figure 4. Contagion with Positive Recovery Rates
Source: Authors’ calculations.
2.3 Liquidity Risk
We now incorporate liquidity effects into our analysis. When a 
bank fails, financial markets may have a limited capacity to absorb 
the illiquid external assets that are sold. As a result, the asset 
price may be depressed. Following Schnabel and Shin (2004) and 
Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin (2005), we assume that the price of 
the illiquid asset, q, is given by
q=e-ax,  (7)
where x > 0 is the fraction of system (illiquid) assets that have been 
sold onto the market (if assets are not being sold onto the market, 
then q = 1). We calibrate α so that the asset price falls by 10 percent 
when one-tenth of system assets have been sold.
We integrate this pricing equation into our numerical simulations. 
Specifically, when a bank defaults, all of its external assets are sold 425 A Network Model of Super-Systemic Crises
onto the market, reducing the asset price according to equation (7). 
We assume that when the asset price falls, the external assets of all 
other banks are marked to market to reflect the new asset price. From 
equation (6), it is clear that this will reduce banks’ capital buffers and 
has the potential to make some banks vulnerable, possibly tipping 
them into default.
The incorporation of (market) liquidity risk introduces a second 
potential source of contagion into the model from the asset-side of 
banks’ balance sheets. Liquidity risk only materializes upon default, 
however. Realistically, asset prices are likely to be depressed by asset 
sales before any bank defaults, so accounting only for the post-default 
impact probably understates the true effects of liquidity risk.
Figure 5 illustrates the effects of incorporating liquidity risk into 
the model. As we might expect, liquidity effects magnify the extent of 
contagion when it breaks out. Contagion is also slightly more likely 
for given values of z.
Figure 5. Liquidity Effects and Contagion
Source: Authors’ calculations.
As shown, liquidity effects do not drastically alter the main 
results of our model, but this should not be taken to mean that 
liquidity effects are unimportant. In part, the limited effect of 
liquidity risk reflects the already high spread of contagion embedded 
in the benchmark scenario. If a fraction of banks were assumed to 426 Prasanna Gai and Sujit Kapadia
be totally immune to counterparty credit risk (that is, they would 
survive even if all their counterparties defaulted), then liquidity risk 
would probably be much more significant in amplifying the extent 
of contagion for intermediate levels of connectivity. To the extent 
that liquidity risk materializes before any bank defaults, it can be 
viewed as having the potential to erode capital buffers and increase 
the likelihood of an initial default.
2.4 The Impact of Credit Derivatives
We now illustrate the type of analysis made possible by our 
framework by using it to assess the possible impact of credit 
derivatives on the nature of contagion. The use of credit derivatives 
has grown tremendously in recent years. For the net buyers of 
credit protection (typically traditional banks), this has reduced 
their exposure to nonfinancial corporates. At the same time, it has 
increased both their number of links to financial counterparties 
and their overall exposure to them. Meanwhile, net sellers of credit 
protection (such as insurance companies and monolines) have 
implicitly taken on corporate credit risk and become part of the 
financial network through their activities. For the system as a whole, 
the greater use of credit risk transfer may have slightly reduced 
capital buffers.
To capture these features in our model, we assume that the 
greater use of credit derivatives increases the number of incoming 
links for a typical bank and correspondingly expands the share of 
interbank assets on its balance sheet. Specifically, we assume the 
following functional form for Ai
IB (ji):
Ai
IB (ji) = aji
b+c,  (8)
where a > 0 and b > 0 are parameters controlling the extent to which 
the total interbank exposure increases with the number of incoming 
links.10 We also assume that the total stock of retail assets in the 
economy has remained constant. Together, these assumptions imply 
that the number of institutions in the network must have increased, 
which we associate with the integration of insurance companies, 
10. Intuitively, introducing this relationship curtails the risk-sharing benefits of 
greater connectivity because the greater absolute exposure associated with a higher 
number of links partially offsets the positive effects from greater diversification.427 A Network Model of Super-Systemic Crises
hedge funds, and monolines into the system. To capture the possible 
erosion of capital buffers, we suppose that the total capital in the 
system remains unchanged despite the increase in the number of 
participants. As a result, all institutions become slightly less well 
capitalized as credit derivatives assume a greater role. All of these 
effects automatically key off an increase in the average degree, z.
Since our focus is on the relatively limited set of key players in 
global credit derivative markets, we suppose that in the initial state 
before the advent of credit derivatives, there were only 100 banks, 
with each having a 4 percent capital buffer and just two interbank 
links, on average. We then simulate the system for different values 
of z, assuming that a = 0.02, b = 0.85, and c = 0.03, that the loss 
given default on interbank exposures is 100 percent, and that there 
are no liquidity effects. Given that the typical bank currently has 
an interbank asset share of approximately 20 percent (Upper, 2007), 
this parameterization generates reasonably plausible interbank asset 
shares for the corresponding number of links (see table 1, column 2). 
For example, if a bank is linked to one-fifth of the system (z = 20), 
interbank assets constitute 28.5 percent of its balance sheet.





















2 6.6 93.4 100 4.00 7.8 3.8
5 10.9 89.1 105 3.82 6.2 5.4
10 17.2 82.8 113 3.55 2.1 35.4
15 23.0 77.0 121 3.30 0.9 67.8
20 28.5 71.5 131 3.06 0.9 89.1
25 33.9 66.1 141 2.83 0.2 100.0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 1 shows how the probability and spread of contagion vary 
with z. Given our focus on major international financial institutions 
in this analysis, we adopt a lower threshold for recording contagion 
events, counting all episodes in which more than one bank defaults 
as a result of the initial failure. It is evident from the table that the 
greater use of credit derivatives, as captured by an increase in z, 
may have reduced the likelihood of contagion following an initial 428 Prasanna Gai and Sujit Kapadia
failure. Moreover, to the extent that credit risk transfer may reduce 
the probability of an initial default, the results may understate its 
beneficial effects. Nevertheless, the role of credit derivatives as a 
potential shock amplifier is revealed by the sharply increasing spread 
of contagion. With an average of five links, contagion only affects 
roughly 5 percent of the system when it breaks out. An increase to 
ten or fifteen links changes the picture completely—once started, 
crises become super-systemic.
These results (and indeed all of the numerical results presented 
in the paper) are cast in terms of random graph network structures 
involving financial intermediaries (nodes) with comparable balance 
sheets. As such, our findings could underestimate the impact of an 
actual financial crisis. If the first bank to fail is particularly large or 
highly connected (such as Lehman Brothers), then the consequences 
could be much more severe. Albert, Jeong, and Barabasi (2000) 
study the effects of targeted attacks on hubs and show how critical 
nodes are vital to the spread of contagion.11 The existence of a key 
node may also be beneficial, however. With clear analogies to the 
epidemiological literature on targeted vaccination of highly connected 
nodes (Anderson and May, 1991), if the authorities are able to identify 
and bail out key players in the network ex ante, then prospective 
contagion could be very substantially contained. Extensions of our 
analysis in these directions are likely to reach similar conclusions.
3. ConClusion
In this paper, we develop a model of contagion in arbitrary 
financial networks that nests the two competing views of financial 
systems as shock absorbers or amplifiers. In so doing, our framework 
helps clarify how shocks are transmitted across markets and banking 
systems. A key finding is that while greater connectivity helps lower 
the probability of contagion, it can also increase its spread in the 
event of problems occurring. Illiquid markets for key financial assets 
compound the problem, amplifying both the likelihood and extent 
of contagion.
Our model helps illustrate how the failure of a large organization 
linked to other entities via credit derivatives might play out in the 
absence of a public sector rescue. The use of credit derivatives in our 
11. Nier and others (2007) also provide some analysis of shocks to key nodes in 
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model creates far-reaching interlinkages and large absolute exposures 
compared with financial systems that lack such instruments. We 
demonstrate how the expansion of credit derivative activity may 
have worked to curtail some of the risk-sharing benefits offered by 
such innovation, leaving open the scope for a much more virulent 
or super-systemic crisis.
Finally, the paucity of relevant balance sheet data on many 
financial  entities  and  the  international  nature  of  financial 
intermediation make the empirical modeling of contagion risk 
difficult to undertake. By isolating probability and impact, our paper 
also makes a methodological contribution, pointing toward analytical 
and numerical approaches for assessing the effects of changes in 
network structure on contagion risk.
Our paper is best viewed as a first step in a research agenda that 
seeks to develop a deeper understanding of large, complex financial 
networks. Clearly, there remains scope to sharpen the calibration 
that forms the basis of the main results. A more pressing challenge, 
however, is to relax some of the more mechanical assumptions of 
the analysis. Developing a more behavioral foundation in ways 
that capture the richness of financial network structure is a crucial 
next task if such models are to offer further meaningful guidance 
for policymakers.430 Prasanna Gai and Sujit Kapadia
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